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HAMILTONIAN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
HASSAN NAJAFI ALISHAH AND PEDRO DUARTE
Abstract. We introduce a class of o.d.e.’s that generalizes to polymatrix games
the replicator equations on symmetric and asymmetric games. We also introduce
a new class of Poisson structures on the phase space of these systems, and
characterize the corresponding subclass of Hamiltonian polymatrix replicator
systems. This extends known results for symmetric and asymmetric replicator
systems.
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1. Introduction
State of the art. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) originated from the work
of John Maynard Smith and George R. Price who applied the theory of strategic
games developed by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern to evolution prob-
lems in Biology. Unlike Game Theory, EGT investigates the dynamical processes
of biological populations.
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2 ALISHAH AND DUARTE
Independently A. Lotkla and V. Volterra introduced the following class of o.d.e.’s
dxi
dt
= xi
(
ri +
n∑
j=1
aij xj
)
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) ,
currently known as Lotka-Volterra (LV) systems, and usually taken as models for
the time evolution of ecosystems in n species. Although historically this class of
systems preceded EGT they are now considered an integral part of this theory. The
entries aij represent interactions between different species, while the coefficients
ri stand for the specie’s natural growth rates. In his studies [19] V. Volterra gave
special attention to predator-prey systems and their generalization to food chain
systems in n species, which fall in the category of dissipative and conservative
LV systems. Denoting by A = [ aij]ij its interaction matrix, a LV system is said
to be dissipative, resp. conservative, if there exists a positive diagonal matrix
D such that AD + DAt ≤ 0, resp. AD is skew symmetric. The matrix D was
interpreted by Volterra as some sort of normalization by the average weights of
the different species. If the LV system admits an equilibrium point q ∈ Rn the
following function H : int(Rn+)→ R
H(x) =
n∑
j=1
xj − qj log xj
is either a decreasing Lyapunov function, if the system is dissipative, or else a con-
stant of motion, if the system is conservative. Volterra proved that the dynamics
of any n species conservative LV system can be embedded in a Hamiltonian system
of dimension 2n. More recently, in the 1980’s, Redheffer et al. developed further
the teory of dissipative LV systems, introducing and studying the class of stably
dissipative systems [14–18]. In [2] a re-interpretation was given for the Hamilton-
ian character of the dynamics of any conservative LV system: there is a Poisson
structure on Rn+ which makes the system Hamiltonian. Another interesting fact
from [2], which stresses the importance of studying Hamiltonian LV systems, is
that the limit dynamics of any stably dissipative LV system is described by a
conservative LV system.
Another class of o.d.e.’s, which plays a central role in EGT, is the replicator
equation defined on the simplex ∆n−1 = {x ∈ Rn+ |
∑n
i=1 xi = 1} by
dxi
dt
= xi
(
n∑
j=1
aij xj −
n∑
k,j=1
akj xk xj
)
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) .
The coefficients of this o.d.e. are stored in an n×n real matrix A = [ aij]ij, that is
referred as the pay-off matrix. A game theoretical interpretation for this equation
is provided in section 3. Check [8] on the history of this equation. In [9] J. Hofbauer
introduced a change of coordinates, mapping Rn+ to the simplex ∆n minus one face,
which conjugates any LV system in Rn+ to a time re-parametrization of a replicator
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system in ∆n, and vice-versa. Thus when a LV system is conservative then the
corresponding replicator system is orbit equivalent to a Hamiltonian system. On
the other hand, any replicator system on ∆n−1 with skew symmetric pay-off matrix
extends to a LV system on Rn+ with ri = 0, and hence can be viewed as a restriction
of a Hamiltonian LV system on Rn+. Up to our knowledge these are the known
subclasses of Hamiltonian replicator systems.
Asymmetric or bimatrix games lead to another fundamental class of models in
EGT, the following system of o.d.e.’s whose coefficients are displayed in two pay-off
matrices, A of order n×m and B of order m× n.
dxi
dt
= xi
(
m∑
j=1
aij yj −
n∑
k=1
m∑
j=1
akj xk yj
)
i = 1, .., n
dyj
dt
= yj
(
n∑
i=1
bji xi −
m∑
k=1
n∑
i=1
bki yk xi
)
j = 1, ..,m
The phase space of this equation is the prism ∆n−1 ×∆m−1. A game theoretical
interpretation is given in section 3. It was remarked by I. Eshel and E. Akin [5]
that up to a time re-parametrization these systems always preserve volume. For
λ-zero-sum games (λ < 0) and λ-partnership games (λ > 0), with an interior
equilibrium point in the prism ∆n−1 ×∆m−1, J. Hofbauer proved in [7] that this
bimatrix system is orbit equivalent to a Hamiltonian system w.r.t. some Poisson
structure in the interior of the prism. Previously, E. Akin and V. Losert [1] had
noticed the Hamiltonian character of this model in the zero-sum case.
Polymatrix games, like n-player games, generalize the concept of bimatrix games.
The main difference between them is that interactions between players are bilat-
eral in the former game but not in the latter. The first reference we could find on
the existence of equilibria for these games is the paper of J. Howson [10] who at-
tributes the concept of polymatrix game to E. Yanovskaya (1968). More recently,
the structure of Nash equilibria for polymatrix games is studied by L. Quintas
in [13].
Main results. We introduce a class of o.d.e’s, referred as polymatrix replicator
equation, that generalizes to polymatrix games the symmetric and asymmetric
replicator equations. We are not aware of any reference on this equation in the
literature. The phase space of these systems are finite products of simplexes. We
introduce the concept of conservative polymatrix game, which in the case of bi-
matrix games extends the λ-zero-sum games (λ < 0) and the λ-partnership games
(λ > 0). In Theorem 3.13 we introduce a class of Poisson structures on finite
products of simplexes (see (3.4)). We will show that these prisms are stratified
Poisson spaces (see section 4). Then in Theorem 3.20 we show that any conserva-
tive polymatrix game determines a Hamiltonian polymatrix replicator. This work
extends and unifies several known facts on Hamiltonian replicator o.d.e.’s. In the
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end of section 3 we compare our results with known facts mentioned in the state
of the art subsection.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the needed concepts
from Poisson geometry. In section 3 we state and prove the main results. In section
4 we discuss a method introduced in [6], called singular Poisson reduction, which
gives a geometric interpretation of the Poisson structures defined in section 3. In
the last section we workout a couple of examples.
2. Generalities on Poisson Structures
In this section we will provide a short introduction to Poisson geometry focused
on some dynamical aspects, see any standard textbook on Poisson manifolds and
related topics, for example [3, 11].
Let M be an n-dimensional smooth manifold. We denote by C∞(M) the space
of smooth functions on M . A Poisson structure on M is an R-bilinear bracket
{., .} : C∞(M)× C∞(M)→ C∞(M) which satisfies:
i) Anti-symmetry i.e. {f, g} = −{g, f} for every f, g ∈ C∞(M).
ii) Leibniz’s rule i.e. {fg, h} = f{g, h}+ g{f, h} for every f, g, h ∈ C∞(M).
iii) Jacobi identity i.e. {{f, g}, h}+ {{g, h}, f}+ {{h, f}, g} = 0
The Leibniz’s rule says that for any smooth function H : M → R the map {., H} :
f 7→ {f,H} is a deriviation on C∞(M) which in turn yields a vector XH on
M defined by the equality {f,H} = df(XH). The vector field XH is called the
Hamiltonian vector field associated to H on the Poisson manifold M .
The singular distribution D(x) := {Xf (x) | f ∈ C∞(M)} is called the character-
istic distribution of M . As a consequence of the Jacobi identity this distribution
integrates to a singular foliation. Denote by Sx the leaf of this foliation through a
point x. The Poisson structure induces a symplectic form on each leaf Sx, passing
through arbitrary point x ∈ M , of this foliation defined by ωSx(Xf , Xh) = {f, h}.
The foliation S := {(Sx, ωSx)|x ∈ M} is called the symplectic foliation of the
Poisson manifold M .
Remark 2.1. The following are well known properties of Poisson structures:
1) By (i), dH(XH) = {H,H} = −{H,H} = 0. Thus H is an integral of
motion for the vector field XH .
2) The dimension of the linear subspace D(x) is called the rank of the Poisson
structure at point x, which is equal to the dimension of the leaf Sx. Since
this leaf is a symplectic manifold on its own it has even dimension.
3) The symplectic foliation S := {(Sx, ωSx)|x ∈M} completely determines the
Poisson structure.
4) By definition, it is clear that every symplectic leaf Sx is an invariant sub-
manifold for any Hamiltonian vector filed XH . In fact, the restriction of
XH to Sx is Hamiltonian with respect to the symplectic structure ωsx.
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5) Every symplectic manifold (N,ω) is a Poisson manifold with Poisson bracket
defined by {f, g}N := ω(Xf , Xg), where Xf and Xg are the Hamiltonian
vector fields associated to f and g by symplectic structure.
6) A function f is called Casimir if {., f} = 0. Note that Casimirs are
constants of motion for any Hamiltonian vector field. Furthermore, if f1, f2
are two Casimirs then {f1, f2} is also a Casimir due to Jacobi identity.
In a local coordinate chart (U, x1, .., xn), or equivalently whenM = Rn, a Poisson
bracket takes the form
{f, g}(x) = (dxf)t [ piij(x)]ij dxg =
∑
i<j
piij(x)
(
∂f
∂xi
∂g
∂xj
− ∂f
∂xj
∂g
∂xi
)
,
where pi(x) = [ piij(x)]ij = [ {xi, xj}(x)]ij is a skew symmetric matrix valued smooth
function, and for every function f we write
dxf =

∂f
∂x1
(x)
...
∂f
∂xn
(x)
 .
The Jacobi identity translates to:
n∑
l=1
∂piij
∂xl
pilk +
∂pijk
∂xl
pili +
∂piki
∂xl
pilj = 0 ∀i, j, k , (2.1)
or equivalently
{{xi, xj}, xk}+ {{xj, xk}, xi}+ {{xj, xk}, xj} = 0 ∀i, j, k . (2.2)
Clearly, every skew symmetric matrix valued function pi : Rn → Matn×n(R) sat-
isfying condition (2.1) defines a Poisson structure on Rn. In the next section we
shall introduce our Poisson structures through their associated skew symmetric
matrix valued functions, referred as bivectors pi : Rn → Matn×n(R). The term
bivector means that pi(x) is as a linear operator pi(x) : (Rn)∗ → Rn.
Remark 2.2. Regarding the function pi we have
1) For any function H the associated Hamiltonian vector field is defined by
XH = pi dH,
2) The characteristic distribution Dpi(x) is the one generated by the columns
of the matrix pi(x).
3) It transforms under a change of variable ψ : Rn → Rn by
(dmψ)pi(m)(dmψ)
t = pi(ψ(m)), (2.3)
4) A function f ∈ C∞(Rn) is a Casimir if
Xf = pi df = 0.
Let (M, {, }M) and (N, {., .}N) be two Poisson manifolds.
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Definition 2.3. A smooth map ψ : M → N will be called a Poisson map if and
only if
{f ◦ ψ, h ◦ ψ}M = {f, h}N ◦ ψ ∀f, h ∈ C∞(N).
In local coordinate, this condition reads as
(dmψ)piM(m)(dmψ)
t = piN(ψ(m)), (2.4)
where piM and piN are skew symmetric matrix valued functions associated to Pois-
son structures of M and N , respectively, and dmψ is the Jacobian matrix of the
map ψ at point m.
3. Polymatrix games
In this section we introduce the evolutionary polymatrix games to which our
main result applies. This class of systems contains both the replicator models and
the evolutionary bimatrix games.
Consider a population whose individuals interact with each other using one of n
possible pure strategies. The state of the population is described by a probability
vector p = (p1, . . . , pn), with the usage frequency of each pure strategy. This vector
is a point in the n− 1-dimensional simplex
∆n−1 = { (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn : x1 + . . .+ xn = 1, xi ≥ 0 } .
A symmetric game is specified by a n×n pay-off matrix A = [ aij]ij, where the entry
aij represents the pay-off of an individual using pure strategy i against another
using pure strategy j. Given x ∈ ∆n−1, the value (Ax)i =
∑n
j=1 aij xj represents
the average pay-off of strategy i within a population at state x. Similarly, the value
xtAx =
∑n
i,j=1 aij xi xj stands for the overall average of a population at state x,
while the difference (Ax)i−xtAx measures the relative fitness of strategy i in the
population x. The replicator model is the following o.d.e. on ∆n−1
dxi
dt
= xi
(
(Ax)i − xtAx
)
1 ≤ i ≤ n (3.1)
which says that the logarithmic growth rate of each pure strategy’s frequency
equals its relative fitness. The flow of this o.d.e. is complete and leaves the
simplex ∆n−1 invariant, as well as every of its faces.
Next we introduce the class of evolutionary asymmetric, or bimatrix games,
where two groups of individuals within a population (e.g. males and females), or
two different populations, interact using different sets of strategies, say n strategies
for the first group and m strategies for the second. The state of this model is a pair
of probability vectors in the (n+m− 2)-dimensional prism Γn,m = ∆n−1 ×∆m−1.
There are no interactions within each group. The game is specified by two pay-off
matrices: a n × m matrix A = [ aij]ij, where aij is the pay-off for a member of
the first group using strategy i against an individual of the second group using
strategy j, and a m× n matrix B = [ bij]ij with the pay-offs for the second group
members. Assuming the first and second group states are x and y, respectively,
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the value (Ay)i is the average pay-off for a first group individual using strategy
i, the number xtAy is the overall average pay-off for the first group members,
and the difference (Ay)i − xtAy measures the relative fitness of the first group
strategy i. Similarly, (B x)j − ytB x measures the relative fitness of the second
group strategy j when the group states are x and y. The bimatrix replicator is
the following o.d.e. on the prism Γn,m
dxi
dt
= xi
(
(Ay)i − xtAy
)
1 ≤ i ≤ n (3.2)
dyj
dt
= yj
(
(B x)j − ytB x
)
1 ≤ j ≤ m
which again says that the logarithmic growth rate of each strategy’s frequency
equals its relative fitness. The flow of this o.d.e. is complete and leaves the prism
Γn,m invariant, as well as every of its faces.
Finally we introduce the class of polymatrix replicators. Consider p different
populations, or else a single population stratified in p groups. We shall use greek
letters like α and β to denote these groups. Assume that for each group α ∈
{1, . . . , p}, there are nα pure strategies for interacting with members of another
group, including its own. Let us call signature of the game to the vector n =
(n1, . . . , np). The total number of strategies is therefore n = n1 + . . . + np. The
polymatrix game is specified by a single n × n matrix A = [ aij]ij with the pay-
off aij for a user of strategy i, member of one group, against a user of strategy
j, member of another group, possibly the same. The main difference between
polymatrix games and the symmetric game, also specified by a single matrix A,
is that in the polymatrix game competition is restricted to members of the same
group. This means that the relative fitness of each strategy refers to the overall
average pay-off of strategies within the same group. To be more precise we need to
introduce some notation. We decompose A in blocks, A =
[
Aα,β
]
α,β
, where each
block Aα,β =
[
aα,βij
]
ij
is a nα × nβ matrix. Similarly we decompose each vector
x ∈ Rn as x = (xα)α, where xα ∈ Rnα . We say that a strategy i belongs to a group
α, and write i ∈ α, if and only if n1 + . . .+ nα−1 < i ≤ n1 + . . .+ nα. Similarly we
write (i, j) ∈ α× β when i ∈ α and j ∈ β. With this notation we have
(a) xαi = xi if i ∈ α, and
(b) aα,βij = aij if (i, j) ∈ α× β.
Hence the difference (Ax)i −
∑p
β=1(x
α)tAα,βxβ represents the relative fitness of a
strategy i ∈ α within the group α. The polymatrix replicator is the o.d.e.
dxαi
dt
= xαi
(
(Ax)i −
p∑
β=1
(xα)tAα,βxβ
)
∀ i ∈ α, α ∈ {1, . . . , p} , (3.3)
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which once more says that the logarithmic growth rate of each pure strategy’s
frequency equals its relative fitness. The flow of this o.d.e. is complete and leaves
the prism Γn = ∆
n1−1 × . . . × ∆np−1 invariant. The underlying vector field on
Γn will be denoted by XA. The pair G = (n,A) will be referred as a polymatrix
game, and the dynamical system determined by XA = X(n,A) as the associated
polymatrix replicator on Γn.
Remark 3.1. When p = 1, Γn = ∆
n−1 and the evolutionary polymatrix game (3.3)
coincides with the replicator o.d.e. (3.1).
Remark 3.2. When p = 2 and A1,1 = 0, A2,2 = 0 system (3.3) coincides with the
bimatrix replicator (3.2) on Γn = ∆
n1−1 ×∆n2−1.
The proofs of the following three propositions are easy exercises.
Proposition 3.3 (Identity). The correspondence A 7→ X(n,A) is linear and its
kernel is formed by matrices A ∈ Matn×n(R) such that the block matrix Aα,β has
equal rows for all α, β = 1, . . . , p. Thus, two matrices A,B ∈ Matn×n(R) determine
the same vector field X(n,A) = X(n,B) on Γn iff the block matrix A
α,β − Bα,β has
equal rows for all α, β = 1, . . . , p.
Definition 3.4. Given a signature n = (n1, . . . , np) and matricesA,B ∈ Matn×n(R),
we say that the polymatrix games (n,A) and (n,B) are equivalent, and write
(n,A) ∼ (n,B), if and only if Aα,β −Bα,β has equal rows for all α, β = 1, . . . , p.
Equivalent matrices determine the same evolutionary polymatrix game on Γn.
In other words (n,A) ∼ (n,B) iff X(n,A) = X(n,B).
Proposition 3.5 (Equilibria). A point q ∈ Γn is an equilibrium of X(n,A) if and
only if (Aq)i = (Aq)j for all α = 1, . . . , p and every i, j ∈ α.
Definition 3.6. Given a signature n = (n1, . . . , np), we define the set
In := { I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} : #(I ∩ α) ≥ 1, ∀α = 1, . . . , p } ,
where I ∩α := I ∩ [n1 + . . .+nα−1 + 1, n1 + . . .+nα]. A set I ∈ In determines the
face σI := {x ∈ Γn : xj = 0, ∀ j /∈ I } of Γn.
The correspondence between sets in In and faces of Γn is bijective.
Definition 3.7. Consider a polymatrix game G = (n,A). Given a set I ∈ In
the pair G|I = (nI , AI), where nI = (nI1, . . . , nIp) with nIα = #(I ∩ α), and AI =
[ aij]i,j∈I , is called the restriction of the polymatrix game G to the face I.
The following proposition says that the restriction of a polymatrix replicator to
a face is another polymatrix replicator.
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Proposition 3.8 (Inheritance). Consider the system (3.3) associated to the poly-
matrix game G = (n,A). Given I ∈ In, the face σI of Γn is invariant under
the flow of X(n,A) and the restriction of (3.3) to σI is the polymatrix replicator
associated to the restricted game G|I .
We set some notation in order to produce neater formulas. In any matrix equal-
ity the vectors in Rn, or Rnα , should be identified with column matrices. We set
1 = 1n = (1, 1, .., 1) ∈ Rn and will omit the subscript n whenever the dimension
of this vector is clear from the context. Similarly, we write I = In for the n × n
identity matrix, and we omit the subscript n whenever its value is clear. Given
x ∈ Rn, we denote by Dx the n × n diagonal matrix Dx = diag(xi)i For each
α ∈ {1, . . . , p} we define the nα × nα matrix
Tαx := x
α
1
t − I ,
and set Tx to be the n× n block diagonal matrix Tx = diag(Tαx )α.
Given a polymatrix game G = (n,A), we define the matrix valued mapping
piA : Rn → Matn×n(R)
piA(x) := (−1)TxDxADx T tx. (3.4)
We haveDxADx =
[
Dxα A
α,βDxβ
]
α,β
whereDxα A
α,βDxβ =
[
aα,βij x
α
i x
β
j
]
i∈α,j∈β
.
Simple calculations show that piA(x) = [ piA,ij(x)]i,j where for all (i, j) ∈ α× β
piA,ij(x) = x
α
i x
β
j
(
−aα,βij + (Aα,βxβ)i + ((Aα,β)t xα)j − (xα)tAα,βxβ
)
. (3.5)
These computations reduce to the simple case p = 1, n1 = n where
piA(x) = (−1) (x1t − I)DxADx (1xt − I) ,
and
piA,ij(x) = xixj(−aij + (Ax)i + (Atx)j − xtAx) .
Remark 3.9. Notice that piA(x) is a skew symmetric matrix valued map whenever
A is a skew symmetric matrix.
Definition 3.10. A formal equilibrium of a polymatrix game G = (n,A) is any
vector q ∈ Rn such that
(a) (Aq)i = (Aq)j for all i, j ∈ α, and all α = 1, . . . , p,
(b)
∑
j∈α qj = 1 for all α = 1, . . . , p.
Remark 3.11. A formal equilibrium of G = (n,A) is an equilibrium of the natural
extention of X(n,A) to the affine subspace spanned by Γn.
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Next proposition says that the existence of a formal equilibrium is a sufficient
condition for the vector field X(n,A) of system (3.3) to be a gradient of a simple
function H with respect to piA. We denote by Γ
◦
n the topological interior of Γn in
the affine subspace of Rn spanned by Γn.
Proposition 3.12. Given A ∈ Matn×n(R), assume there exists a formal equilib-
rium q ∈ Rn of G = (n,A). Then, setting H(x) = ∑ni=1 qi log xi,
X(n,A)(x) = piA(x) dxH for every x ∈ Γ◦n .
Proof. Consider the vector field Z = piA dH. For any α, and i ∈ α, denote by
Zαi (x) the i-th component of Z(x). Using that
∑
j∈β q
β
j = 1 we have
Zαi (x) =
(
k∑
β=1
piα,βA (x)
qβ
xβ
)
i
=
k∑
β=1
(∑
j∈β
piα,βA,ij(x)
qβj
xβj
)
i
= xαi
k∑
β=1
[
((Aα,βxβ)i − (xα)tAα,βxβ)(
∑
j∈β
qβj ) + (−Aα,βqβ)i + (xα)tAα,βqβ
]
= xαi
(Ax)i − k∑
β=1
(xα)tAα,βxβ +
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(−Aq)i +
∑
i∈α
xαi (Aq)i

= xαi
[
(Ax)i −
k∑
β=1
(xα)tAα,βxβ
]
= XαA,ij(x) ,
where the vanishing term follows from q being an equilibrium point and xα ∈
∆nα−1. This completes the proof. 
For every α = 1, . . . , p consider the (nα − 1)× nα matrix
Eα :=

−1 0 · · · 0 1
0 −1 · · · 0 1
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · −1 1

and set
E := diag(E1, . . . , Ep),
B := (−1)EAEt . (3.6)
Note that E ∈ Mat(n−p)×n(R) and B ∈ Mat(n−p)×(n−p)(R). Next we introduce a
mapping φ : Rn−p → Γ◦n. We write a vector u ∈ Rn−p = Rn1−1 × . . . × Rnp−1 as
u = (uα)α, where u
α := (uα1 , . . . , u
α
nα−1), and the components of φ as φ(u
α)α :=
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(φα(uα))α, where each φ
α : Rnα−1 → (∆nα−1)◦ is the map defined by
φα(uα) :=
 euα1
1 +
nα−1∑
i=1
eu
α
i
, . . . ,
eu
α
nα−1
1 +
nα−1∑
i=1
eu
α
i
,
1
1 +
nα−1∑
i=1
eu
α
i
 .
The following is our main result. Consider a polymatrix game G = (n,A).
Theorem 3.13. If A is skew symmetric then the mapping piA in (3.4) defines
a stratified Poisson structure on Γn. Moreover the mapping φ : Rn−1 → Γ◦n is
a Poisson diffeomorphism if we endow Rn−p with the constant Poisson structure
associated to the skew symmetric matrix B defined in (3.6).
Proof. The map φ : Rn−1 → Γ◦n is a diffeomorphism whose inverse is easily com-
puted. If A is skew symmetric then so is B. Hence this matrix induces a constant
Poisson structure on Rn−p. We want to prove that piA determines a Poisson struc-
ture on Γ◦n which makes φ a Poisson map. By (2.3) we just need to show that for
every u ∈ Rn−p and x = φ(u),
(duφ)B(duφ)
t = (−1)TxDxADxT tx = piA(x) . (3.7)
The fact that piA also determines a stratified Poisson structure on Γn, and on Rn,
will be proved later. See Remark 3.15. In order to prove (3.7), it is enough to see
that for every x = φ(u)
(duφ)E = TxDx .
Writting the components of φα as φα(uα) = (φα1 (u
α), . . . , φαnα(u
α)) we compute for
every i = 1, . . . , nα and j = 1, . . . , nα − 1,
∂φαi
∂uαj
= δij φ
α
i − φαi φαj .
Hence if x = φ(u), the Jacobian of φ at the point u is
duφ = diag(Jα(x
α))α,
where for every α = 1, . . . , p,
Jα(x1, . . . , xnα) :=

x1 − x21 −x1 x2 −x1 x3 . . . −x1 xnα−1
−x2 x1 x2 − x22 −x2 x3 . . . −x2 xnα−1
−x3 x1 −x3 x2 x3 − x23 . . . −x3 xnα−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
−xnα−1 x1 −xnα−1 x2 −xnα−1 x3 . . . xnα−1 − x2nα−1−xnα x1 −xnα x2 −xnα x3 . . . −xnα xnα−1

A simple multiplication of matrices, using the relation x1 + . . . + xnα = 1, shows
that Jα(x
α)Eα = TxαDxα for every α = 1, . . . , p. Therefore
(duφ)E = diag(Jα(x
α)Eα)α = diag(TxαDxα)α = TxDx ,
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which completes the proof. 
The next corollary gives a complete description of the symplectic foliation of
(Γ◦n, piA). Two examples will be given in section 5.
Corollary 3.14 (Symplectic Foliation). The symplectic leaves of (Γ◦n, piA) are the
images of the symplectic leaves of (Rn−p, B) under the diffeomorphism φ. The
symplectic leaf Su of (Rn−p, B) is the (even dimensional) affine subspace through
u parallel to the subspace generated by the columns of B.
Remark 3.15. Given a face I ∈ In consider the payoff matrix AI , see Defini-
tion 3.7. Applying Theorem 3.13 to any face σI of Γn we see that σI is a Poisson
manifold on its own with the Poisson structure piAI . Moreover (σI , piAI ) is the
restriction of (Γn, piA) in the sense that the inclusion map i : σI → Γn is a Poisson
map. Hence the interiors of the faces of Γn, regarded as Poisson manifolds, give
(Γn, piA) the structure of a Poisson stratified space. In addition it will be shown
that piA defines a Poisson structure on Rn. On section 4 we provide a geometric
explanation for these facts.
Proposition (3.12) together with Theorem (3.13) yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3.16. If A is skew symmetric and q ∈ Rn is a formal equilibrium of
G = (n,A) then X(n,A) is a Hamiltonian vector field, with Hamiltonian H(x) =∑n
i=1 qi log xi, w.r.t. the Poisson structure piA in Γ
◦
n.
Definition 3.17. A polymatrix game G = (n,A) is said to be conservative iff
(a) G has a formal equilibrium,
(b) there are matrices A0, D ∈ Matn×n(R) such that
(i) A ∼ A0D,
(ii) A0 is a skew symmetric,
(iii) D = diag(λ1 In1 , . . . , λp Inp) with λβ 6= 0 for every β = 1, . . . , p.
The matrix A0 will be referred as a skew symmetric model for G, and (λ1, . . . , λp) ∈
(R\{0})p as a scaling vector.
Remark 3.18. Given a skew symmetric matrix A0 ∈ Matn×n(R), a signature n
and a point q˜ ∈ Rn such that
(a) (A0 q˜)i = (A0 q˜)j for all i, j ∈ α, and all α = 1, . . . , p,
(b)
∑
j∈α q˜j 6= 0 for all α = 1, . . . , p,
then G = (n,A0D) is a conservative polymatrix game, where D = diag(λα Inα)α
with λα :=
∑
j∈α q˜j, and q = D
−1q˜ is a formal equilibrium of G.
It follows from the previous remark that any generic skew symmetric matrix can
be taken as a model for a conservative polymatrix game. More precisely,
Proposition 3.19. Given a signature n = (n1, . . . , np) with
∑p
α=1 nα = n, the
set of skew symmetric matrices A0 ∈ Matn×n(R) such that G = (n,A0D) is a
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conservative polymatrix game for some diagonal matrix D is an open and dense
subset of the space of skew symmetric matrices.
Next theorem basically says that the replicator system (3.3) is Hamiltonian for
every conservative polymatrix game.
Theorem 3.20. Consider a conservative polymatrix game G = (n,A) with formal
equilibrium q, skew symmetric model A0 and scaling co-vector (λ1, . . . , λp). Then
X(n,A) is Hamiltonian in the interior of the Poisson stratified space (Γn, piA0), with
Hamiltonian function
H(x) =
p∑
β=1
λβ
∑
j∈β
qβj log x
β
j . (3.8)
Proof. In view of definition 3.4 we can assume that A = A0D. For every α, β,
Tαx Dxα A
α,β
0 Dxβ (T
β
x )
tλβ
qβ
xβ
= Tαx Dxα A
α,βDxβ (T
β)t
qβ
xβ
,
where qβ/xβ stands for the componentwise division of the vectors. Adding up in
β, and using Proposition 3.12, we get
piA0(x) dxH = piA(x) dx
(
n∑
j=1
qj log xj
)
= X(n,A)(x) .

In the next paragraphs we compare our results with previously known facts.
Given a skew symmetric matrix A ∈ Matn×n(R), since xtAx = 0 for all x ∈ Rn,
the replicator equation (3.1) reduces to a Lotka-Volterra equation with growth
rates ri = 0
dxi
dt
= xi (Ax)i 1 ≤ i ≤ n . (3.9)
For any q ∈ Rn such that Aq = 0 the function H(x) = ∑nj=1 xj − qj log xj is a
constant of motion for (3.9). A Poisson structure on Rn defined by the bivector
pˆiA(x) = DxADx was introduced in [2]. System (3.9) is Hamiltonian in the interior
of Rn+ w.r.t. pˆiA having H as Hamiltonian function. Like pˆiA the Poisson structure
piA introduced here can be extended to Rn, but unlike piA the structure pˆiA does not
restrict to a Poisson structure on the simplex ∆n−1. Using the Poisson structure
piA we can now say, if there exists q ∈ Rn such that Aq = 0 and
∑n
j=1 qj 6= 0, that
the system (3.9) is Hamiltonian in the interior of the simplex ∆n−1. Furthermore,
here we study the replicator equation itself and not a topologically equivalent LV
system.
Consider now a bimatrix game with signature (n1, n2) and matrix
A =
(
0 A12
A21 0
)
.
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If λ > 0, resp. λ < 0, the polymatrix game ((n1, n2), A) is conservative with
scaling vector (1, λ) if and only if it has a formal equilibrium and the bimatrix game
(A12, A21) is λ-zero-sum game, resp. λ-partnership game, (see definitions in section
11.2 of [8]). Theorem 3.20 generalizes the main result (section 5) in [7], which says
that the evolutionary system (3.2) associated to a λ-zero-sum or λ-partnership
game is orbit equivalent to a bipartite Lotka-Volterra system that is Hamiltonian
w.r.t. some Poisson structure. This leads to the same constant of motion (3.8),
but from the work [7] we only derive the existence of a Poisson structure in the
interior of the prism ∆n1−1 × ∆n2−1 for which some time re-parametrization of
system (3.2) is Hamiltonian w.r.t. that Poisson structure. On the other hand here
we provide a Poisson structure on the full prism that makes the original system
Hamiltonian in the interior of the prism.
We finish this section with an extension of the class of Hamiltonian polymatrix
replicators. Given p smooth functions λα : Γn → R\{0}, α = 1, . . . , p, consider the
matrix valued smooth function D : Γn → Matn×n(R), D(x) = diag(λα(x)Inα)α,
and the system of o.d.e.’s
dxαi
dt
= xαi
(
(AD(x)x)i −
p∑
β=1
λβ(x) (x
α)tAα,βxβ
)
∀ i ∈ α, 1 ≤ α ≤ p (3.10)
associated with the vector field Y (x) = X(n,AD(x))(x) on Γn.
Proposition 3.21. Let A ∈ Matn×n(R) be a skew symmetric matrix, q ∈ Rn a
formal equilibrium of G = (n,A), and consider the 1-form
ξ(x) =
p∑
α=1
∑
j∈α
λα(x) q
α
j
dxαj
xαj
.
Then system (3.10) is the gradient of the 1-form ξ w.r.t. the Poisson structure piA
in the interior of Γn, i.e.,
Y (x) = piA(x) ξ(x) .
System (3.10) is Hamiltonian if the form ξ is exact, i.e., there exists a smooth
function H such that ξ = dH. But even if ξ is not exact, the dynamics of Y leaves
invariant the symplectic foliation of (Γ◦n, piA).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.20. 
The previous model (3.10) contains the following class of o.d.e.’s introduced by
J. Maynard Smith as an extension of the asymmetric replicator equation (3.2).
dxi
dt
= xi
(
(A12 y)i − xtA12 y
)
m1(x, y) 1 ≤ i ≤ n (3.11)
dyj
dt
= yj
(
(A21 x)j − ytA21 x
)
m2(x, y) 1 ≤ j ≤ m
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See appendix J of [20], and system (9.1) in [7]. Taking
A =
[
0 A12
A21 0
]
and D(x) =
[
m2(x, y) Im 0
0 m1(x, y) In
]
system (3.11) reduces to (3.10). Since system (3.11) has a dissipative character
for certain choices of the functions m1(x, y) and m2(x, y) it would be interesting
to investigate analogous properties of system (3.10).
4. Singular Poisson Reduction
This section is devoted to elaborate Remark (3.15). We will review the singular
Poisson reduction introduced in [6] and use it to show that the phase space of
an evolutionary game with a skew symmetric payoff matrix is a Poisson stratified
space.
A smooth action of a Lie group G on the manifold M is a smooth map
A : G×M →M
such that for every g, h ∈ G and m ∈ M one has A(gh,m) = A(g,A(h,m)) and
A(e,m) = m, where e is the identity element of G. For every g ∈ G, Ag denotes
the diffeomorpism defined by m 7→ A(g,m).
The action is said to be proper if the map
G×M →M ×M (g,m) 7→ (m,A(g,m)),
is proper. Recall that a map is called proper if the preimage of any compact subset
is compact. The stabilizer of a point m ∈M is
Gm := {g ∈ G| A(g,m) = m}
The action is called free if Gm = {e} for every m ∈M . The set
Om := {A(g,m)| g ∈ G}
is called the orbit passing through the point m ∈M and the set
M/G := {Om| m ∈M}
is called the orbit space of the action. The map piG : M → M/G sending every
point m to its orbit Om is called the projection map of the action. The orbit space
M/G can be given a topology by U ⊂ M/G being open if and only if pi−1G (U) is
open in M . With this topology, it is a Hausdurff topological space if the action is
proper. We will only consider proper actions so the orbit space shall always be a
Hausdorff topological space all over this section.
For any subgroup H of G the H-isotropy type submanifold of M is
MH := {m ∈M |Gm = H},
and the (H)-orbit type submanifold is
M(H) := {m ∈M |Gm ∈ (H)},
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where (H) denotes the conjugacy class of H in G. Notice that the action of G
restricts to M(H) and M(H)/G can be defined and is called the (H)-orbit type
reduced space.
We recall the definition of a smooth stratified space, see [4, 12].
Definition 4.1. Let X be a paracompact Hausdorff topological space. A smooth
stratification of X is a locally finite partition of X into locally closed connected
smooth submanifolds Si (i ∈ I), called the strata of the stratification, such that
for a pair of submanifolds Si, Sj if Si ∩ S¯j 6= 0 then Si ⊂ S¯j. When this happens
Si is called incident to Sj or a boundary piece of Sj.
The following proposition is a well-known result in the theory of Lie group
actions, see e.g. [4, 12] for the proof.
Proposition 4.2. If the action of the Lie group G on M is proper then the orbit
space M/G is a smooth stratified space. Furthermore, if the action is free then
M/G can be equipped with a smooth manifold structure such that the projection
map piG becomes a submersion.
A function f ∈ C∞(M) is called G-invariant if and only if
f ◦ Ag(m) = f(m) ∀g ∈ G,m ∈M.
Any G-invariant function reduces to a function on M/G so we define:
Definition 4.3. The algebra of smooth functions on the orbit space M/G is
C∞(M/G) := {f ∈ C0(M/G)| f ◦ piG ∈ C∞(M)},
where C0(M/G) denotes the algebra of continuous functions on the topological
space M/G.
Definition 4.4. An action of G on the Poisson manifold (M, {., .}) is called Pois-
son if Ag is a Poisson diffeomorphism for every g ∈ G.
Notice that if the action is Poisson i.e.
{f ◦ Ag, h ◦ Ag} = {f, g} ◦ Ag ∀f, h, g
then Poisson bracket of any two G-invariant function is again G-invariant. Using
this fact, a bracket can be defined on the algebra of smooth functions on M/G by
{f, h}M/G(Om) = {f ◦ piG, h ◦ piG}(m′), (4.1)
where m′ is an arbitrary element of Om. In the case of free proper Poisson action
this bracket is a Poisson bracket on the manifold M/G. Clearly piG is a Poisson
map between (M, {., .}) and (M/G, {., .}M/G).
It is clear that (C∞(M/G), {., .}M/G) is a Poisson algebra. Recall that a Poisson
algebra is an algebra equipped with a skew symmetric bracket satisfying Leibniz’s
rule and Jacobi identity. We state Theorem 2.12 of [6] which will be used to show
that the phase space of an evolutionary polymatrix game with a skew symmetric
payoff matrix is a Poisson stratified space.
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Theorem 4.5 (Singular Poisson Redution). Let A : G ×M → M be a proper
Poisson action. Then the connected components of the orbit type reduced space
M(H)/G form a Poisson stratification {Si}i∈I of (M/G, {., .}M/G) i.e. a smooth
stratification such that
• Each Strata Si i ∈ I, is a Poisson manifold.
• The inclusions i : Si →M/G are Poisson maps.
The following is, basically, the example which is presented in [6, Section 2.5].
Let
M = Cn1\{0} × . . .× Cnp\{0},
where n1, . . . , np are integers such that n = n1 + . . . + np. We will consider M as
a real 2n dimensional manifold with coordinates (ξ, η) ∈ R2n where zi = ξi + iηi
for i = 1, . . . , n. Equip M with the quadratic Poisson structure defined by:
piM(dwi, dwj) = {wi, wj}M = 1
4
aijwiwj,
where i, j = 1, . . . , n for w = ξ, η and A is a skew symmetric matrix. In the
language of bivectors:
piM(ξ, η) =
1
4
(
DξADξ DξADη
DηADξ DηADη
)
.
We shall denote by C∗ the group of non zero complex numbers. The group (C∗)n
acts on M by component-wise multiplication. Denote this action by
A(λ, z) = (λ1z1, . . . , λnzn) (4.2)
Lemma 4.6. The action of (C∗)n on M is Poisson i.e. for any λ ∈ (C∗)n the
linear map Aλ : M →M defined by
z 7→ (λ1z1, . . . , λnzn)
is a Poisson map.
Proof. In real coordinates, we denote λ = (ξ0, η0) and z = (ξ, η). By this notation
Lλ(z) = (ξ0ξ − η0η, η0ξ + ξ0η),
where ξ0ξ stands for component-wise multiplication of these vectors. Similarly for
ξ0η, η0ξ and η0ξ. We need to check condition (2.3). Clearly,
d(ξ,η)Aλ =
(
Dξ0 −Dη0
Dη0 Dξ0
)
Simple calculation shows
1
4
(d(ξ,η)Aλ)
(
DξADξ DξADη
DηADξ DηADη
)
(d(ξ,η)Aλ)t =
1
4
(
D(ξ0ξ−η0η)AD(ξ0ξ−η0η) D(ξ0ξ−η0η)AD(η0ξ+ξ0η)
D(η0ξ+ξ0η)AD(ξ0ξ−η0η) D(η0ξ+ξ0η)AD(η0ξ+ξ0η)
)
= piM(Aλ(ξ, η))
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
Consider the subgroup G of (C∗)n defined by,
G := {(λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ (C∗)n : |λi| = |λj|, ∀ i, j ∈ α, ∀α = 1, . . . , p }
The Poisson action of (C∗)n on M restricts to a Poisson action of G on M . Clearly,
this action is proper.
By Theorem 4.5 the quotient space M/G is a Poisson stratified space. The
quotient space M/G can be identified by Γn. The identification is obtained via
the map
(x1, . . . , xp) : Cn1\{0} × . . .× Cnp\{0} → ∆n1−1 × . . .×∆np−1,
where xα : Cnα\{0} → ∆nα−1 defined by
xα(zα1 , . . . , z
α
nα) = (
|zα1 |2
|zα1 |2 + . . .+ |zαnα|2
, . . . ,
|zαnα|2
|zα1 |2 + . . .+ |zαnα|2
)
Above and in the sequal 0 = (0, . . . , 0) denotes a zero vector, while 0 stands for
a zero scalar. The strata of Γn = M/G i.e. the (H)-orbit type reduced space with
H being a subgroup of G, see Theorem 4.5, are identified with the faces of Γn. Let
e be the identity element of G, then the ({e})-orbit type reduced space is Γ◦n, the
interior of Γn.
For any α = 1, . . . , p, i ∈ α
dxαi =− 2xαi
1
rα
(0, . . . , ξα, . . . ,0,0, . . . , ηα, . . . ,0)t
+
2
rα
(0, . . . , (0, . . . , ξαi , . . . , 0), . . . ,0, . . . , (0, . . . , η
α
i , . . . , 0), . . . ,0)
t,
where rα = |zα1 |2 + . . . + |zαnα |2. Let β = 1, . . . , p and j ∈ β also, by definition,
see (4.1), we have
{xαi , xβj }Γ◦n =
1
4
(dxαi )
t
(
DξADξ DξADη
DηADξ DηADη
)
(dxβj )
= (Wα)t
(
DξαA
α,βDξβ DξαA
α,βDηβ
DηαA
α,βDξβ DηαA
α,βDηβ
)
W β,
where
Wα :=
1
rα
[−xαi ξα + (0, . . . , ξαi , . . . , 0),−xαi ηα + (0 . . . , ηαi , . . . , 0)]
A strait forward calculations show:
{xαi , xβj }Γ◦n = (piA)α,βi,j ,
where piA is defined at (3.4). This shows that {xαi , xβj }Γ◦n is the same Poisson
structure on Γ◦n that was considered in Section (3) . The same holds for all the
faces of Γn, which justifies Remark 3.15.
HAMILTONIAN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES 19
Notice that in our case the condition (2.2) is an algebraic equality which holds on
Γ◦n. The equality (2.2) is invariant w.r.t. multiplication of xi, xj, xk with constant
numbers. Hence our algebraic equality must hold on the open subset Rn+, which
in turn yields that it is satisfied all over Rn, i.e., piA is actually a Poisson structure
on Rn.
5. Examples
It is possible to fully classify the dynamics of 2D and 3D conservative polymatrix
replicator systems, but in this section we just briefly describe two examples of 3D
polymatrix replicators.
First Example. Consider the signature n = (2, 2, 2), take the skew symmetric
matrix
A0 =

0 −1 0 1
2
0 1
1 0 0 −1
2
−1 1
2
0 0 0 0 1
2
−1
−1
2
1
2
0 0 0 0
0 1 −1
2
0 0 −1
2−1 −1
2
1 0 1
2
0
 ,
and the point p =
(
7
4
, 3
4
, 5
4
, 1, 1, 1
)
such that A0 p =
(
3
4
, 3
4
,−1
2
,−1
2
,−3
8
,−3
8
)
. Con-
sider the matrix A = A0D, where D = diag
(
5
2
, 5
2
, 9
4
, 9
4
, 2, 2
)
. This matrix is
A =

0 −5/2 0 9/8 0 2
5/2 0 0 −9/8 −2 1
0 0 0 0 1 −2
−5/4 5/4 0 0 0 0
0 5/2 −9/8 0 0 −1
−5/2 −5/4 9/4 0 1 0
 .
By remark 3.18 ((2, 2, 2), A) is a conservative polymatrix game. The phase space
of the associated replicator system is the cube
Γ(2,2,2) = ∆
1 ×∆1 ×∆1 ≡ [0, 1]3 .
In the model [0, 1]3, the equilibrium point q = D−1p has coordinates q =
(
7
10
, 5
9
, 1
2
)
,
and hence is an interior point. The line through q with direction v =
(
6
5
,−4
9
,−1)
intersects the cube [0, 1]3 along the set Σ of equilibria of this replicator system.
This set Σ is a line segment joinning two points in the faces {x = 1} and {z = 1}.
To compute the symplectic foliation of ]0, 1[3 consider the matrix
E =
 1 −1 0 0 0 00 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1

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and define B = −E A0Et. A simple calculation gives
B =
 0 1 −12−1 0 −3
2
1
2
3
2
0
 .
Figure 1. Phase portraits of 3D polymatrix replicators
The vector w =
(−3
2
, 1
2
, 1
)
is orthogonal to the space spanned by the columns of
B. The symplectic leaves of the constant Poisson structure on R3 defined by the
skew symmetric matrix B are the planes orthogonal to w. Thus, if we consider
the Poisson diffeomorphism φ : R3 →]0, 1[3,
φ(u1, u2, u3) =
(
eu1
1 + eu1
,
eu2
1 + eu2
,
eu3
1 + eu3
)
,
the symplectic leaves on ]0, 1[3 are the φ images of these planes. Inverting the map
φ, the symplectic leaves are given by the equations(
x
1− x
)−3/2(
y
1− y
)1/2(
z
1− z
)
= ec
⇔ (1− x)3/2y1/2z = ecx3/2(1− y)1/2(1− z) ,
with c ∈ R. Let U+, resp. U−, be the union of the faces {x = 1}, {y = 0},
{z = 0}, resp. {x = 0}, {y = 1}, {z = 1}. On the interiors of these two open
subsets of the cube’s boundary the equation above is never satisfied. Therefore
the closure of every symplectic leaf intersects the cube’s boundary along the closed
curve C = ∂U+ = ∂U− ⊂ ∂[0, 1]3. Because Σ intersects both U− and U+, it follows
that every symplectic leaf must intersect Σ, hence having a unique equilibrium.
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The orbits of our polymatrix replicator foliate each symplectic leaf into closed
curves around that equilibrium point. We can also check that C is a heteroclinic
cycle of the vector field X(2,2,2),A. See Figure 1(a).
Second Example. Consider the signature n = (3, 2), take the skew symmetric
matrix
A0 =

0 0 1
2
1
2
−1
0 0 −1
2
1
2
−1
2−1
2
1
2
0 1 1
2−1
2
−1
2
−1 0 0
1 1
2
−1
2
0 0
 ,
and the point p =
(
9
10
,−8
5
, 1
2
, 0, 1
)
such that A0 p =
(−3
4
,−3
4
,−3
4
,− 3
20
,− 3
20
)
. Con-
sider the matrix A = A0D, where D = diag
(−1
5
,−1
5
,−1
5
, 1, 1
)
. This matrix is
A =

0 0 − 1
10
1
2
−1
0 0 1
10
1
2
−1
2
1
10
− 1
10
0 1 1
2
1
10
1
10
1
5
0 0
−1
5
− 1
10
1
10
0 0
 .
By remark 3.18 ((3, 2), A) is a conservative polymatrix game. The phase space of
the associated replicator system is the prism
Γ(3,2) = ∆
2 ×∆1 ≡ { (x, y, z) : 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1, x+ y ≤ 1 } =: P .
In the model P ⊂ R3 the equilibrium point q = D−1p has coordinates q =(−9
2
, 8, 0
)
, and hence is not interior to P . The line of equilibria goes through q
with direction v =
(−5
2
, 5,−1) and does not intersect the prism P . To compute
the symplectic foliation of P ◦ consider the matrix
E =
 1 −1 0 0 01 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1

and define B = −E A0Et. A simple calculation gives
B =
 0 1 −12−1 0 −1
1
2
1 0
 .
The vector w =
(−1, 1
2
, 1
)
is orthogonal to the space spanned by the columns of
B. The symplectic leaves of the constant Poisson structure on R3 defined by the
skew symmetric matrix B are the planes orthogonal to w. Thus, if we consider
the Poisson diffeomorphism φ : R3 → P ◦,
φ(u1, u2, u3) =
(
eu1
1 + eu1 + eu2
,
eu2
1 + eu1 + eu2
,
eu3
1 + eu3
)
,
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the symplectic leaves on P ◦ are the φ images of these planes. Inverting the map
φ, the symplectic leaves are given by the equations(
x
1− x− y
)−1(
y
1− x− y
)1/2(
z
1− z
)
= ec
⇔ (1− x− y)1/2y1/2z = ecx(1− z) ,
with c ∈ R. Let U+, resp. U−, be the union of the faces {x + y = 1}, {y = 0},
{z = 0}, resp. {x = 0}, {z = 1}. On the interiors of these two open subsets of
the prism’s boundary the equation above is never satisfied. Therefore the closure
of every symplectic leaf intersects the prism’s boundary along the closed curve
C = ∂U+ = ∂U− ⊂ ∂P . The points r = (1, 0, 0) and s = (0, 0, 1) on C are
respectively a global repeller and a global sink of the polymatrix replicator, and
every symplectic leaf is foliated into orbits flowing from the repeller r to the sink
s. The closed curve C is also the union of two heteroclinic chains from r to s.
See Figure 1(b). Note that this dynamical behaviour does not contradict the
Hamiltonian character of the system because the area of each symplectic leaf is
infinite.
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